The dual loop system of the ITCS is comprised of a lowtemperature loop (LTL) and a moderate-temperature loop (MTL) . Each loop has a pump package assembly (PPA), a system flow control assembly (SFCA), a threeway mixing valve (TWMV), several rack flow control assemblies (RFCA), cold plates, pressure sensors, temperature sensors, pump bypass assembly (PBA) and a heat exchanger. In addition, the MTL has an additional TWMV, a payload regeneration heat exchanger (P/RHE) and a manual flow control valve (MFCV). The LTL has a service performance and checkout unit (SPCU) heat exchanger. The two loops are linked via one loop crossover assembly (LCA) providing cross loop capabilities and a single PPA, two-loop functionality.
One important parameter monitored by the ground stations and on-orbit is the amount of fluid leakage from the ITCS. ISS fluid leakage is of importance since ITCS fluid is costly to re-supply, may be difficult to clean up in zero-g, and if uncontained could lead to equipment failures and potential hazards. This paper examines the nominal leakage observed over period of a year of on-
INTRODUCTION
The ITCS provides heat removal for critical life support systems, avionics cooling, and experiment heat loads. It is comprised of pumps, valves, heat exchangers, coldplates and sensors. The system contains an LTL and a MTL. These single-phase, pumped-coolant loops absorb waste heat from subsystems and other equipment and transport the heat outside the pressurized module. There the loops interface with LTL and MTL heat exchangers where the waste heat is rejected to the External Active Thermal Control System (EATCS). The EATCS rejects the heat to space via the thermal radiators.
The U S Element ITCS loops currently on-orbit are the Laboratory (USL) module, Node 1 and Airlock Module. The Lab ITCS contains dual loops of interconnected plumbing, see Figure 1 , that service redundant life critical subsystems which include command and control, power and data equipment. The dual-loop configuration normally operates in an isolated mode with one pump per loop. Isolation valves provide the capability of operating in the isolated mode or to operate both loops with a single common pump in the cross-connected mode. Node 1 has no independent pumping capability, and the ITCS consists mainly of fluid lines that pass through from the Lab or Node 3 to the airlock.
Node 2 contains low-and moderatetemperature loops, but they always operate separately. This paper will deal mainly with the US Laboratory module.
ISS US LAB ITCS AND COMPONENTS
The US. Laboratory module ITCS provides the means for transporting thermal energy from the rack to the water-ammonia interface heat exchangers. The ITCS is comprised of two separate water cooling loops: one LTL and one MTL. These loops can be operated separately or cross-connected to provide redundancy in case of a failure of one of the pumps.
COMPONENTS OF THE ITCS
Pump Package Assembly -The PPA, shown in Figure   2 , is designed to provide coolant pumping, gas removal and coolant filtration. The PPA is made up of the pump assembly, gas trap and filter assembly. An accumulator, located downstream of the gas trap provides fluid reservoir capacity and accommodates fluid expansion and contraction caused by thermal fluctuations. A quantity sensor measures the coolant volume within the accumulator and reports it to the MDM. -. Three-way Mixing Valve -The TWMV is shown in Figure 5 . This assembly controls and mixes two coolant flows, from various heat loads, which enter through ports A and B. The valve continuously varies and blends the flows, as needed, and delivers the mixtures to the ITCS through the valve outlet port. . '.
System Flow Control Assembly -The SFCA is shown in Figure 6 . This assembly provides for proper coolant pressure at various locations in the ITCS and for pump isolation capability.
. . Cold Plates -The ISS ITCS utilizes eight different sizes of cold plates, shown in Figure 9 . The cold plates are designed to remove heat at a rate commensurate with design point performance. In order to satisfy this requirement, each component in the system was required to meet a certain leakage requirement. Since it is difficult to test for water leakage directly the component leakage requirement was specified as a gaseous leakage quantity and this amount of leakage was then converted to water leak rate. Also since ITCS is comprised of a variety of different components (e.g., pumps, valves, coldplates, heat exchangers, hardlines, flex hoses, fittings, etc.), different gaseous specifications are used for each of the major components.
MV (regen)
Flex hoses were treated differently from other items. Since the majority of the ITCS flex hoses are made of Teflon and are permeable to gases, a gaseous leak rate specification in Nitrogen or Helium could not be used. Instead the flex hoses were extensively tested to obtain the amount of leakage per unit length and the total leak rate was added to total calculated leak rate for the system. The leakage rate through effusion for the R267-8 Teflon hose that was determined through testing was: 1 11 00 psia 3x1 0-3 GM H20/DAY-FOOT. leakage paths within the ITCS (e.g., sharp edged orifice or long torturous path). The leak path around hard seals of Gamah fittings and fluid disconnects is mostly of the orifice type, whereas the around gaskets or seals the leak path is probably of the long torturous type as might be seen in the pump package assembly seals. Neverheless, a comparison of both types of leakage was considered using the orifice flow and viscous (Poiseuille) flow equations.
Per Reference (6), the flow through a square-edged orifice is given by:
Where: Q = flow, cubic Wsec Y = Compressibiity factor C = Discharge coefficient G = gravitational accelertion, 32.2 Wsec DP = pressure differential, psid W = weight density, Ib/cu ft A = flow area, sq. ft After simplifying terms and rearranging the equation is:
Due to the lack of data on leakage (effusion) from Teflon Where: w(h20) = 62.4 Ibm/cu.ft. flex hoses no specification was established for the flex W(He) = 0.0103 Ibm/cu.ft Q 14.7 psia hoses. Rather, the amount of leakage determined = 0.0804 Ibm/cu.ft. Q 114.7 psia through testing and it was assumed that purposes of Y = 0.6 for shock flow through and controlling and monitoring systems within the US orifice Destiny Lab, MDM units are used.
RC(He) = =0.5
Substituting P1 = 114.7 psia, P2 = 14.7 psia and q(l) = .8 cchr and converting s d s e c the equivalent gaseous leak rate is:
Using these values, plus P1= 114.7 psia, P2=14.7 psia, and q(1) = .8 cchr H20/sec we get:
Q (He) = 1.6 scc He / sec.
Q(He) = 2.2E2 SCC Hdsec
Considering viscous (Poiseuille) flow, the equation for gaseous to liquid leakage simplifies to
Since the type of leak path is likely to be a combination of orifice type and viscous type it was concluded that all leak paths were assumed to be orifice type since this is the most conservative assumption.
Using the conversion 0.8 cc H20lhr = 2.2E-2 SCC Hdsec. for gaseous to water leakage, the total leakage for the US. Laboratory module can be calculated as shown in Table 2 . Based on spec gaseous leak rates converted to a water leak rate at the MDP of 100 psia, the total calculated lab leakage rate is:
1.65 cc/hr for both loops.
Leakage rates calculated using the above method can be reduced by taking into consideration the actual component pressure within the system. Taking this into consideration, the total Lab leakage rate is:
1.1 2 cchr for both loops.
This calculated leakage can be further reduced by taking into consideration the "zero leakage" point. Below a certain gaseous leak rate, water will not leak. The zero water leakage rate range is between 1E-3 to 1E-4 scc/sec of Helium.
In order to retain a comfortable measure of conservatism the "zero leak" limit was not employed during the verification of Lab leakage requirements. Further refinements and consideration of hoses for payloads resulted in a total calculated total Lab leakage rate of:
1.41 cc/hr for both loops.
In the next section the predicted leakage quantity is compared with the actual on-orbit leakage and leakage specifications.
Fluid Leakage On-orbit Data -Fluid quantities are one of the many parameters monitored by the Mission Support Room in Houston, Texas. The accumulator quantity sensor located in the Low-and Moderatetemperature pump package assemblies provides a realtime means of determining ITCS fluid quantity and provides and means for assessing leakage. The accumulator quantities for the low-and moderatetemperature loops are shown in Figure 12 and Figure  13 , respectively, for a period of approximately one year.
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Figure 12. Low-Temperature Accumulator Quantity
A special case of leakage is where an abrupt change in rate of fluid loss takes place which represents an actual small leak not large enough to trigger the automatic leak detection software (known as LRITCS) but larger than the normal background system leakage. There have been two such events on-orbit to date. While these leakages represented a noticeable change in slope of leakage quantities, in neither case did these leakages exceed applicable leak specifications. However, since the normal leak is so small (less than 1% per month), even a small leak that doesnot exceed the spec leak rate of 0.8 cdsec produces a noticeable accelerated trend. These two off-nominal leakage events will be discussed in more detail in the next section.
After removing the abrupt changes in fluid volume, the normal leakage for each system was determined. The cumulative normal leakage rates for the low-and moderate-temperature loop is shown in Figure 14 and Figure 15 , respectively.
. As can be seen in Figure 12 and Figure 13 , there are several events (e.9. sampling, transitions, refills, etc.) that cause the accumulator quantities to change abruptly. However, some of these events are not considered leakages since the fluid is either contained (as in the case of sampling) or transferred from one loop to the other (as in the case of transitions). In order to assess nominal system leakage these quantities must be factored out since they affect the accumulator quantities but are not actually leakages. As can been seen in Figure 14 , the low-temperature cumulative leakage quantity is not as smooth as the moderate-temperature cumulative leakage. This is partially due to the fact there was a leakage event on the low-temperature loop. This leakage event is indicated by the change of slope starting in September of 2002 and lasting for approximately twenty-eight days.
It may also be observed that the moderate-temperature loop cumulative quantity flattens out in mid-March of 2003. This is due to the transition to single low temperature loop mode (LT PPA operating) where the Moderate-temperature PPA is off and the accumulator quantity is no longer in the active fluid loop.
Since the requirement is stated in cc/hr of leakage, the data was gathered and converted to a cu'hr per loop. The conversion for leakage from percent of accumulator quantity is calculated as follows:
Leakage (cc/hr) = % QuanJloO X 650 in3 X16.39 cc/in3
Therefore, 1 % drop in accumulator quantity = 106.5 cc.
The calculated accumulator leakage (cchr) is shown in Figure 16 and Figure 17 for the low-and moderatetemperature loops.
Based on the data gathered from Figure 14 through Figure 17 , it can be seen that the average leakage rate for the low-and moderate-temperature loops are as follows: These leak rates are compared to the allowable spec leakage rate of 0.8 cchr per loop. Therefore, the average rate of leakage to date compared to allowable leak rate is 10 to 20 times better than specification, excluding specific leakage events.
ON-ORBIT LEAKAGE EVENTS
There have been several events that have caused either a gain or loss in accumulator quantities. See Figure 18 . Many of these are planned events such as fluid sampling and accumulator refills. In some cases accumulator quantities are affected by planned system operations such as loop transitions where a known quantity of fluid is transferred from one accumulator to the other In these cases the fluid quantity transfer is expected. In other cases unexpected fluid quantity losses or transfers have occurred. In one such case, an anomaly occurred where a check valve stuck causing ITCS fluid to be transferred from one accumulator to other. This anomaly will be addressed further in this section. In addition, there have been Occurrences where accumulator quantities have dropped when installing fluid jumpers during rack re-configurations. In these cases it was found that the fluid jumpers contained a small amount of air causing the accumulator quantities to drop in relation to the amount of air that was contained in the volume. Initially, upon installation, the air was compressed and then later was removed by the gas trap.
Leakage events of the most concern are those where fluid is uncontained in the cabin. These can be large and noticeable to barely detectable but larger than normal. There have been two such leakage events on ISS since the start up of the active fluid loops. The first was of the barely detectible type where there were no obvious visible signs of leakage, but there was a change in the normal accumulator quantity trend. The second event was large enough to be noticeable by the crew and happened while the ITCS was changed from the normal operating configuration to the unmanned configuration. The unmanned configuration was being used because both crewmembers were conducting an EVA with no crewmembers inside the station.
The first on-orbii leakage event -The first leakage event on ISS occurred over a 2&day period ending October 3,2002. During this period the low-temperature accumulator quantity decreased by 1.2%. This is a relatively small leak (128 cc's) and only slightly larger than the normal leak trend. At the time there were no known actions (Le. samples, transitions, etc.) that would have caused this accelerated drop in accumulator quantity. Also during this period of time it was observed that the moderate temperature accumulator quantity was decreasing at rate of only 0.3% per month (subtracting out known quantity transfers).
Although the leak rate seen in the low temperature loop was less than the allowable spec leak rate of 0.8 cc/hr. it was greater than the previous observable trend, and therefore it was investigated.
The candidate leak sources were: (1) leaking from fittings of the sample hardware, (2) leaking quick disconnects, (3) excessive weeping from the gas trap membrane caused from the effect of nickel, (4) a bubble in the system, possibly due to QD ops or nominal PL connections, (5) permeation of water vapor through Teflon hoses, (6) temperature change.
One by one the potential leak sources were analyzed, investigated and ruled out. Since the leak was so small it took several months of trend monitoring to evaluate if there was a real leakage event or perhaps some heretofore unknown characteristic of the system. Figure 19 shows the low-temperature accumulator leakage rate as a percentage of accumulator quantity computed for 30-day intervals.
The period of accelerated leakage is clearly shown as a spike occurring in early September of a range up 1.2% per month.
After months of evaluation only one of the candidate leak sources given above had not been ruled out. Evaluation leakage data indicated that the possible source of the leak was the supply QD's for the atmosphere revitalization (AR) rack.
Based on this information the crew took action to inspect and clean the a low temperature AR rack QDs. Small evidence of leakage was found, but only after further trend monitoring was it concluded that the action taken by the crew to wipe and clean the mating surfaces of the AR rack QDs actually halted the leak. The root cause of the leakage was therefore attributed to transient foreign object debris (F.O.D.) Based on the trend shown in Figure 19 , it was concluded that the normal leakage for the low-temperature loop was less than 1% per month. Any leakage greater than 1% would be a signal for the thermal control system (TCS) team to investigate for possible abnormal leakage.
During Leak Event
Second onsrbit leakage event -The second leakage event while the ITCS was configured in the unmanned configuration. The ITCS jumpers were in the unmanned configuration from GMT 2004/056/15:00 until 2004/58/23:00. The unmanned configuration is performed to provide a redundant method means of cooling the moderate-temperature loop racks in the event of a leak while the crew is not present. This entails switching the ITCS to dual loop mode and installing jumpers from the low-temperature loop to selected racks to provide redundancy. While the rack jumpers were we uninstalled the crew observed visible leakage around forward endcone QDs (around 30 ml) and leakage around a second QD located at the Deck 1 location (around 125 ml).
The period of leakage can be seen in Figure 21 for the time period from 58:23 to 56:lO. Table 3 summarizes the actual water leakage during this time period. While the crew reported a loss of 175 ml, the actual amount of fluid lost was 11 9 ml. Based on the normal leakage of approximately 15 ml expected for this period of time, that actual additional loss of fluid was 104 ml.
It was assumed the leakage was a result of Foreign Object Debris (F.O.D.) as occurred in the first incidence of off-nominal leakage. Confirmation of the cause of this leakage will be confirmed after the hardware is returned to the ground and inspected.
Accumulator quantity transfer -sticking check valve -The on-orbit ITCS fluid level in the LTL accumulator was reduced during March, 2003. Simultaneous increase of the MTL fluid level was observed. The cause of this phenomenon is due to reverse leakage of the fluid through the PPA check valve. The reverse leakage allowed the fluid to gather in the MTL accumulator. The substance was analyzed at Boeing Huntsville laboratories and identified as polymeric methacrylate adhesive (Similar to LocTite). The substance was not found on any components upstream or downstream from the check valve, leading to the conclusion that the substance was local to the check valve and, therefore, must have occurred during manufacture of the valve.
Additional unused check-valves from inventory were examined. The valves from inventory were from a second batch of the valves purchased at a later date than the first valve that were disassembled and analyzed. Four valves were examined and no contamination was found.
The design of the check valve was evaluated simultaneously. It was revealed that the centerline of the valve body (with valve seat) and centerline of the guide were eccentric to each other up to .0025 in. The diametrical clearance between the poppet ID and guide OD is .0005 to .001 in. causing a potential gap between the seat and the poppet. (See Figure 25 and Figure The gap was evident during evaluation of the check valve light test (see Figure 27 ). It is possible that such an opening can occur due to a design problem or contamination or a combination of both.
Figure 27. Check Valve Gap
The approach to fix both of these issues is to take a number of steps.
1. Modify valve design to increase clearance between the poppet ID and guide O.D. 2. Clean and assemble the check valve in a clean room environment 3. Handle check valves with care so that no contamination is introduced.
It is anticipated that after these changes, the check valve should operate normally without any abnormal leakage. The internal contamination should be benign and should have no effect on check valve leakage.
CONCLUSIONS
The operational experience to date has demonstrated that the ITCS fluid quantities have been managed with minimal impact by ground monitoring and software controls.
The data presented in this report has demonstrated that the nominal leak rate to date is nearly 10 to 20 times better than worse case predictions and 10 to 20 times better than specifications which are based on worse case leakage assumptions.
While there have been occurrences of abnormal leakage, in all cases the leakages have been relatively small and where they are not, have been isdated to one or two known locations.
For the future, the effect of coalescence of particulates in the ITCS remains an area to be closely monitored since it is suspected to be a source of contamination and possible cause of the known leakage events. Therefore, control of particulates in ITCS fluid remains an area where improvements can be made for future fluid systems.
